The rise of the phenomenon of virtue ethics in recent years has increased at a rapid pace. Such an explosion carries with it a number of great possibilities, as well as risks. This volume has been written to contribute a multi-faceted perspective to the current conversation about virtue. Among many other thought-provoking questions, the collection addresses the following: What are the virtues, and how are they enumerated? What are the internal problems among ethicists, and what are the objections and replies (...) to contemporary virtue ethics? Additionally, the practical implications following from the answers to these questions are discussed in new and fascinating research. Fundamental concepts such as teleology and eudaimonism are addressed from both a historical and dialectical approach. This tome will contribute not only to providing further clarity to the current horizons in virtue ethics, but also to the practical conclusion following from the study: to challenge the reader toward a greater pursuit of the virtuous life. (shrink)

The aim of this paper is to explain, by means of Aristotelic texts, the answer to two questions related to the mentioned concepts: 1) What is the goal and purpose of the philosophy of human things?: and 2) To whom is this knowledge addressed?

La concepción de la vida como un juego divino –lilah- es una noción relevanteque atraviesa el mundo de la literatura india antigua. El símbolo de los dados se instalacomo un arquetipo de connotaciones cosmológicas, rituales, destínales y, naturalmente,lúdicas. En este trabajo comentaremos dos narrativas del ciclo épico del Mahâbhârata: losavatares de los reyes Nala y Yudhishthira. Ambos relatos muestran una estructura especulary comparativa cuya función es constituirse en un nuevo ejemplo sapiencial tanto en formacomo en contenido.

Artists, political scientists and art historians share with other professionals the challenge of apprehending and comprehending the complexity of the realities they address in their work. The co‐authors of our article coincide in the prominence they give to disturbing indexical signs (i.e., indications and traces of trauma and normalization in people, in political processes and works of art), as keys of interpretation and problematizing at the basis of their art works, their social work and their historic and political research. They (...) address the challenges and questions they face when interacting with the multiple dimensions inherent to the complex human behaviours, theoretical concepts and artistic statements on which they focus. Finally, they discuss possible aesthetic, ethical and philosophical implications of their proposals and perspectives. (shrink)

El ejercicio utópico de la voluntad política que caracteriza el XIX latinoamericano se desgrana en las categorías de unidad continental, unidad cultural, unidad en el concepto de Patria, etc.; clausurando un apretado siglo de extrema densidad social y política, un siglo de utopía en el discurso. Una Ilustración insuficiente, el coste del hibridismo, las comunidades imaginadas, las dependencias encadenadas, las resistencias, los logros y los fracasos, traducen el sacrificio, la traición y la inconclusión de la tarea emancipatoria. Si podemos contemplar (...) hoy día el descubrimiento de América como el comienzo de una empresa civilizatoria, y admirar sus obras más allá del trabajo infatigable de una destrucción que no ha cesado, es sólo en virtud de esta tradición de crítica y resistencia , a lo largo de un proceso social, artístico y literario ininterrumpido hasta el día de hoy. (shrink)

Silence is reserved for what cannot be verbally expressed. The well-known Wittgensteinian quote summarizes an established understanding of the relationship between language and silence: because language is not enough to account for reality and thinking, it must be transcended by other means of expression, like music or silence. But what if the opposite is the case and silence is not the extension but the precondition of language, the ultimate source of meaning? This paper explores how this is the phenomenological and (...) Derridean philosophical framework of Coetzee’s novels, a literary universe created from the will to signify and build singular meanings. (shrink)

Las aminas biógenas son compuestos nitrogenados de pequeño tamaño con actividad biológica que se forman por la descarboxilación enzimática de ciertos aminoácidos. Las aminas biógenas se encuentran presentes en todos los seres vivos, en los que participan en procesos biológicas de gran importancia. Sin em­bargo, debido al metabolismo de algunos microorganismos, estos compuestos se pueden acumular en alimentos en concentraciones elevadas, constituyendo un riesgo para la salud de los consumido­res. Para que las aminas biógenas alcancen estas concentraciones elevadas en los (...) alimentos se requiere, como condición indispensa­ble, la presencia de microrganismos productores, por lo que se han desarrollado diferentes métodos para detectar la presencia de los mismos. Entre estos métodos, aquellos basados en técnicas inde­pendientes de cultivo, como la PCR, presentan ventajas como su gran especificidad, el hecho de ser rápidos y de fácil realización, y que en muchos casos ni siquiera es necesario un tratamiento previo de la muestra, lo que facilita su incorporación a las plantas de elabo­ración. En este trabajo se describen algunos de los métodos dispo­nibles en la actualidad para la detección de microorganismos pro­ductores de aminas biógenas, así como sus posibles aplicaciones. (shrink)

IntroductionRheumatologists are the primary healthcare professionals responsible for patients with rheumatic diseases and should acquire medical ethical competencies, such as the informed consent process. The objective clinical structured examination is a valuable tool for assessing clinical competencies. We report the performance of 90 rheumatologist trainees participating in a station designed to evaluate the ICP during the 2018 and 2019 national accreditations.MethodsThe station was validated and represented a medical encounter in which the rheumatologist informed a patient with systemic lupus erythematosus with (...) clinically active nephritis about renal biopsy. A trained patient–actor and an evaluator were instructed to assess ICP skills in obtaining formal informed consent, delivering bad news and overall communication with patients. The evaluator used a tailored checklist and form.ResultsCandidate performance varied with ICP content and was superior for potential benefit information but significantly reduced for potential complications and biopsy description. Only 17.8% of the candidates mentioned the legal perspective of ICP. Death was omitted by the majority of the candidates ; after the patient–actor challenged candidates, only 57.1% of them gave a clear and positive answer. Evaluators frequently rated candidate communications skills as superior, but ≥1 negative aspect was identified in 69% of the candidates.ConclusionsEthical competencies are mandatory for professional rheumatologists. It seems necessary to include an ethics competency framework in the curriculum throughout the rheumatology residency. (shrink)

What kind of thing is a reason for action? What is it to act for a reason? And what is the connection between acting for a reason and rationality? There is controversy about the many issues raised by these questions. In this paper I shall answer the first question with a conception of practical reasons that I call ‘Factualism’, which says that all reasons are facts. I defend this conception against its main rival, Psychologism, which says that practical reasons are (...) mental states or mental facts, and also against a variant of Factualism that says that some practical reasons are facts and others are false beliefs. I argue that the conception of practical reasons defended here provides plausible answers to the second and third questions above; and gives a more unified and satisfactory picture of practical reasons than those offered by its rivals. (shrink)

Frente a la esclavitud natural defendida por Aristóteles, algunos intentan salvaguardar la coherencia interna del discurso, mientras que otros la niegan. Sin pretender un juicio valorativo, se busca esclarecer la naturaleza del esclavo, de la mujer y de las relaciones entre señor, mujer y esclavo en el oikos.

Understanding human beings and their distinctive rational and volitional capacities requires a clear account of such things as reasons, desires, emotions, and motives, and how they combine to produce and explain human behaviour. Maria Alvarez presents a fresh and incisive study of these concepts, centred on reasons and their role in human agency.

In this paper I propose a way of characterizing human agency in terms of the concept of a two‐way power. I outline this conception of agency, defend it against some objections, and briefly indicate how it relates to free agency and to moral praise‐ and blameworthiness.

In 1969 Harry Frankfurt published his hugely influential paper 'Alternate Possibilities and Moral Responsibility' in which he claimed to present a counterexample to the so-called 'Principle of Alternate Possibilities' ('a person is morally responsible for what he has done only if he could have done otherwise'). The success of Frankfurt-style cases as counterexamples to the Principle has been much debated since. I present an objection to these cases that, in questioning their conceptual cogency, undercuts many of those debates. Such cases (...) all require a counterfactual mechanism that could cause an agent to perform an action that he cannot avoid performing. I argue that, given our concept of what it is for someone to act, this requirement is inconsistent. Frankfurt-style alleged counterexamples are cases where an agent is morally responsible for an action he performs even though, the claim goes, he could not have avoided performing that action. However, it has recently been argued, e.g. by John Fischer, that a counterexample to the Principle could be a 'Fischer-style case', i.e. a case where the agent can either perform the action or do nothing else. I argue that, although Fischer-style cases do not share the conceptual flaw common to all Frankfurt-style cases, they also fail as counterexamples to the Principle. The paper finishes with a brief discussion of the significance of the Principle of Alternate Possibilities. (shrink)

In the past thirty years or so, the doctrine that actions are events has become an essential, and sometimes unargued, part of the received view in the philosophy of action, despite the efforts of a few philosophers to undermine the consensus. For example, the entry for Agency in a recently published reference guide to the philosophy of mind begins with the following sentence: A central task in the philosophy of action is that of spelling out the differences between events in (...) general and those events that fall squarely into the category of human action. There is no consensus about what events are. But it is generally agreed that, whatever events may prove to be, actions are a species or a class of events. We believe that the received view is mistaken: actions are not events. We concede that for most purposes, the kind of categorial refinement which is involved in either affirming or denying that actions are events is frankly otiose. Our common idiom does not stress the difference between actions and events, at least not in general terms, because it has no need to. Perhaps it sounds a little odd to say that some events are performed; but if we balked at describing, say, the abdication of Edward VIII as one of the politically significant events in Britain in 1936, it could not be for metaphysical reasons. And since actions, like events, are datable — though often, as we shall see, only imprecisely — actions are said to take place and to occur. But an important class of actions consist in moving something; indeed, according to many philosophers, every action consists in moving something. And when we consider actions of this sort from a theoretical point of view it becomes imperative to distinguish between actions and events. Or so we shall argue. (shrink)

Reasons can play a variety of roles in a variety of contexts. For instance, reasons can motivate and guide us in our actions (and omissions), in the sense that we often act in the light of reasons. And reasons can be grounds for beliefs, desires and emotions and can be used to evaluate, and sometimes to justify, all these. In addition, reasons are used in explanations: both in explanations of human actions, beliefs, desires, emotions, etc., and in explanations of a (...) wide range of phenomena involving all sorts of animate and inanimate substances. This diversity has encouraged the thought that the term 'reason' is ambiguous or has different senses in different contexts. Moreover, this view often goes hand in hand with the claim that reasons of these different kinds belong to different ontological categories: to facts (or something similar) in the case of normative/justifying reasons, and to mental states in the case of motivating/explanatory reasons. In this paper I shall explore some of the main roles that reasons play and, on that basis, I shall offer a classification of kinds of reasons. As will become clear, my classification of reasons is at odds with much of the literature in several respects: first, because of my views about how we should understand the claim that reasons are classified into different kinds; second, because of the kinds into which I think reasons should be classified; and, finally, because of the consequences I think this view has for the ontology of reasons. (shrink)

The last three decades have seen much important work on powers and dispositions: what they are and how they are related to the phenomena that constitute their manifestation. These debates have tended to focus on ‘paradigmatic’ dispositions, i.e. physical dispositions such as conductivity, elasticity, radioactivity, etc. It is often assumed, implicitly or explicitly, that the conclusions of these debates concerning physical dispositions can be extended to psychological dispositions, such as beliefs, desires or character traits. In this paper I identify some (...) central features of paradigmatic dispositions that concern their manifestation, stimulus conditions, and causal bases. I then focus on a specific kind of psychological disposition, namely character traits, and argue that they are importantly different from paradigmatic dispositions in relation to these features. I conclude that this difference should lead us to re-examine our assumption that character traits are dispositions and, by implication, whether we can generalize conclusions about physical dispositions to psychological dispositions, such as character traits and their manifestations. (shrink)

Frente a la esclavitud natural defendida por Aristóteles, algunos intentan salvaguardar la coherencia interna del discurso, mientras que otros la niegan. Sin pretender un juicio valorativo, se busca esclarecer la naturaleza del esclavo, de la mujer y de las relaciones entre señor, mujer y esclavo en el oikos. In face of the natural slavery defended by Aristotle, some commentators try to protect the internal coherence of his discourse, while others deny it. Trying not to give a value judgment, the article (...) seeks to clear up the nature of the slave, the woman and the relationships between master, woman, and slave within the oikos. (shrink)

In Nicomachean Ethics IV Aristotle exposes the characteristics of the moral virtue of the μεγαλοψυχία and offers a detailed description of the conditions of the magnanimous. St. Thomas in his commentary on Ethics follows the Aristotelian text apparently without disagreeing with the Greek author, and completes this exposition with other texts found in the Summa Theologica. The aim of this paper is to highlight the differences, if there are any, between the Aristotelian conception of the μεγαλοψυχία and that of Saint (...) Thomas, considering also whether the virtue of humility that appears in the Thomist texts can be equated to the vice of the pusillanimity of which Aristotle speaks. (shrink)

The purpose of this paper which centers on the anthropology and ethics of St. Thomas Aquinas is to articúlate «conscience and choice» from the realistic viewpoint, thus ordering the concepts of law, synderesis, conscience, deliberation and choice.

This article was made possible thanks to a research grant by C.I.R.I.T. . The research took place in Birmingham under the direction of Prof. N.J.H. Dent, Head of the Department of Philosophy at the University of Birmingham. I would like to thank him and the other members of the Department for the kindness and support I was given.

The aim of this paper is to explain, by means of Aristotelic texts, the answer to two questions related to the mentioned concepts: 1) What is the goal and purpose of the philosophy of human things?: and 2) To whom is this knowledge addressed?

Frequently, philosophers use examples to make their ideas clearer to readers. Later, commentators take these examples and go beyond the philosophers’ original intentions. This doubtless occurs because the example is so well-chosen that it prompts questions or problems that did not concern the example’s originator at the time. While the example may serve its original context well, however, it cannot respond to questions for which it was not devised. This is the case with the famous example of the mother-in-law and (...) daughter-in-law offered by Iris Murdoch as evidence that it is possible to speak of morality even when the transformations of a subject only affect the subject’s inner life. Because Murdoch’s example is so rich, it has served as the starting point for other analyses that address the mother-in-law’s motives and the transformation process she undergoes as her view of the daughterin- law changes. That is the case with the present paper, which sets out to analyse the relationship between painstakingly acquired knowledge of the reality of the other and the loving gaze (LG). Basing my analysis on Murdoch’s example, I will apply my conclusions to an interpretation of the mother-in-law’s transformation process. In this process of inner transformation, virtue is understood as “(...) a just mode of vision and a good quality of consciousness”1, and it appears to be a key element in explaining her change. However, the question that must be asked is whether virtue is the cause behind the transformation of her view of reality or, rather, when her view undergoes change, she then enters into the realm of virtue. In other words, does virtue give rise to LG or does LG lead to virtue? (shrink)

La inclusión del patriotismo dentro de la moralidad depende de cuál sea el fundamento de la legitimidad de las decisiones morales. El artículo analiza el texto de Alasdair MacIntyre, Is Patriotism a Virtue?, y pone en relieve la complejidad de referirse a los términos ‘patriotismo’ o ‘nación’ en el caso de situaciones políticas como, por ejemplo, la española.

Las células madre embrionarias humanas son células pluripotentes con potenciales aplicaciones en medicina regenerativa e interés considerable en investigación y biotecnología. Sin embargo, dada la estrecha relación con principios morales y bioéticos, ha existido una considerable discusión sobre la posibilidad de patentar o no este tipo de células madre. En el presente artículo, se revisa la legislación europea en materia de propiedad industrial, y la tradición del sistema jurídico continental en el reconocimiento de la dignidad humana como principio fundamental y (...) su relación con la protección de invenciones biotecnológicas, centrados en la reciente sentencia del caso Brüstle v. Greenpeace e.V. (shrink)

Two conceptions of motivating reasons, i.e. the reasons for which we act, can be found in the literature: (1) the dominant 'psychological conception', which says that motivating reasons are an agent's believing something; and (2) the 'non-psychological' conception, the minority view, which says that they are what the agent believes, i.e. his beliefs. In this paper I outline a version of the minority view, and defend it against what have been thought to be insuperable difficulties - in particular, difficulties concerning (...) 'error cases' (cases where what the agent believes is false); and difficulties concerning the explanation of action. Concerning error cases, I argue that if we are motivated by something believed that is true, what motivates us to act is a motivating reason. By contrast, if we are motivated by something believed that is false, then what motivates us to act is merely an apparent motivating reason. Either way, what motivates us is, as the non-psychological conception says, what we believe and not our believing it. I offer an account of the relation between motivating reasons and the explanation of action, and argue that this account helps bring out two important points. One is that the fact that we often do, and indeed sometimes must, use explanations such as 'He did it because he believed that p' does not vindicate the psychological conception of motivating reasons. The other is that endorsing the non-psychological conception of motivating reasons does not commit one to a non-factive view of explanations of action. (shrink)

After nearly sixty years, the influence of Peter Strawson’s ‘Freedom and Resentment’ remains strong in discussions of moral responsibility. However, as the paper has become more remote in time and in intellectual climate, some of those influences have turned into amplifications of ideas and claims that are misinterpretations or distortions of the paper, while other notions have been projected onto it. I try to make the case for this charge specifically in relation to what has become accepted as Strawson’s ‘response-dependent’ (...) theory of moral responsibility and to an allegedly problematic conception of blame said to be at the centre of that theory. Against that background, I comment on the current philosophical project to ‘civilize’ blame. (shrink)

Esta investigación tiene como objetivo principal reflexionar sobre la efectividad de las aplicaciones de arqueología virtual en públicos escolares para la comprensión y el aprendizaje del patrimonio arqueológico con el fin de aprehender de qué manera las tecnologías, como la Realidad Aumentada y la Realidad Virtual, pueden aportar un valor añadido a las propuestas educativas realizadas por museos y sitios arqueológicos que no cuentan con esta inclusión. El análisis exploratorio del caso se realiza en el Museo del Mar de Santa (...) Pola (España) que ha desarrollado este tipo de aplicaciones en el yacimiento arqueológico romano que gestiona, el Portus Ilicitanus. (shrink)

This paper explores the question whether whatever is done intentionally is done for a reason. Apart from helping us to think about those concepts, the question is interesting because it affords an opportunity to identify a number of misconceptions about reasons. In the paper I argue that there are things that are done intentionally but not done for a reason. I examine two different kinds of example: things done “because one wants to” and “purely expressive actions”. Concerning the first, I (...) argue that the tendency to think that things done because one wants to are things done for a reason derives from conflating the reason that explains why someone did something with their reason for doing it. While these sometimes coincide, they need not always do so. And although the fact that someone wanted to do something can contribute to explaining the person's action, it is not normally that person's reason for doing that thing. Purely expressive actions also provide examples of things done intentionally but not for a reason. I argue that, although those actions are spontaneous, they are nonetheless intentional and that, since they are mere expressions of emotions, they are not done for reasons - although there are reasons why we do them. (shrink)

RESUMEN El trabajo tiene como objetivo revelar la contribución social de médicos camagüeyanos negros a la educación católica, a partir de su relación con los colegios regentados por la Iglesia, en un contexto marcado por desigualdades raciales. Se utilizaron métodos teóricos como la revisión documental y bibliográfica, también fueron aplicadas historias de vida y entrevistas. La investigación se centra en el quehacer asistencial de médicos camagüeyanos, vinculados a las Hermanas Oblatas de la Providencia, en particular a los colegios a cargo (...) de estas monjas negras, que educaban a niñas y niños de ese color de piel. Se pudo esclarecer quiénes fueron los doctores más vinculados a esas instituciones y establecer cuál fue su labor en ellas en las décadas del 40- 50 del siglo XX. Queda valorada su contribución social en la asistencia brindada a ese segmento poblacional y al significado de esta sin la mediación de prejuicios raciales. ABSTRACT The purpose of this paper is reveal the social contribution of black Camagüey doctors to the Catholic education from it relation with the schools occupied by the church in a context marked by racials ineguality. It put in practical use theoric methods such as documentary an bibliographical revisión; it also were aplyed life history and entreviews. The research it focus in the assistance job of the Camaguey doctor linked to the Sisters Providence Oblates, especially the schools of these black nuns who give education to black girls and boys. The paper show who were the doctors most linked to these religious institution and to situate their Jobs in these schools in the ´40 and ´50 of the 20 th century. Their social contribution is valved in this type of population and the meaning of this contribution with out racial prejudice. (shrink)